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[Crim. No. 7587. In Bank. Jan. 30, 1964.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH 
BARRY SHELTON et al, Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Reasonableness-Burden of Proof.-
l\-"hl're a search has been made without a warrant, the burd.·n 
is on the prosecution to show proper justification. 
[2] Id.-Incidental to Arrest.-A search of an apartment rented 
by defendant was not justified as incident to defendant's ar· 
rest which took place at a different apartment about 2 miles 
away. 
[3] Id.~Incidental to Arrest.-Even assuming that police officers 
had reasonable cause to believe that deft'ndant was in posses-
sion of narcotics at an apartment about. 2 miles away from 
the apartlllent in which he was arrested, a search of the 
former apartment without II warrant could be justified onl,v 
as incident to a lawful arrest therein or pursuant to a valid 
consent. 
['4] Id.-Incidental to Arrest.-Search of an apartment could not 
be justifi('d on the ground that police officers had reasonable 
cause to an-est the occupant before they demanded that she 
open the door, where the officers knew only that a woman was 
in the apartU1t'nt in which defendant might have stored nar-
cotics; sueh association betwcen a suspect and even a known 
criminal is not, by itself, reasonable cause for an arrest and 
search. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, §§ 22, 25; Am.Jur., 
Searehes and Seizures (1st ed § 52). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 19; [2-4, 
12] Searches and Seizures, § 24; [5, 7, 8] Searches and Seizures, 
~ 22; [6] Searches and SeizUI·es, § 20; [9, 11] Searches and 
f:eizure!!, § 6; [10] Searches and Seizures. § 11. 
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[5] Id.-Consent.-A sl'ar('h of an apartment was not jUfltifirel b~' 
defendant's consent thl'reto where the involuntary natur(' of 
such consent was established by the fact that defendant 
was under arrest at the time it was given and by dt·fendant's 
subsequent refusal to assist the officers in gaining access. to 
the apartment; moreover, even if defendant had voluntarily 
con;;('ntl'd to thc search, his consent could not justify the 
invasion of his joint occupant's privacy that occurred when 
a police officer demanded that the door be opened. 
[6a, 6b] Id.-What Constitutes Unreasonable Search.-A search 
of an apartment was not justified on thc ground that thc 
occupnnt voluntarily opened the door and thereby cxposed 
evidence suffieient to justify her arrest and a search incident 
thereto where the door was opened by virtue of a wrongful 
aSflertion of authority by police officers who, when they de-
manded that the door be opened, had no reasonable cnUi'e 
to arrest the occupant and no right to oreler the door opencd. 
[7] Id.-CoJi.Sent.-To protect his right to object to an unreason-
ahle srarch or seizure a defendant need not forcibly resist 
an officer's asscrtion of authority to enter his home or search 
it or his person, but if he freely consents to an entry or 
search, or voluntarily produces evidence against himself, his 
constitutional rights are not violated and any search or tak-
ing of evidence pursuant to his consent is not unreasonable. 
[8] Id.-Consent.-Whether in a particular case an apparent con-
sent to a search was in fact voluntarily given or was in sub-
nlission to an express or implied assertion of authority is a 
qurstion of fact to be determined in the light of all the 
cireUlustances. 
[9] ld.-Investigations Palling Short of Search.-The right to 
set·k intl'ryiews with suspects at their homes does not include 
the right to dl'mand that a suspect open his door. 
[10] ld.-Search Warrants-Determination of Necessity for.-A 
suspect has no duty to cooperate with officers in securing 
evidence against him, and in the absence of probable cause 
to make an arrest, he is entitled to have a magistrate de-
termine whether there is justification for invading the privacy 
of his home. 
[11] Id.-Investigations Falling Short of Search.-The right to 
seek interviews with suspects does not justify an officer's in-
truding himself into a home without cOllscnt, either physically 
or by a view of the interior made possible only by a wrong-
ful assertion of authority. 
[12] ld.-Incidental to Arrest.-The rule that permits a search 
[5J See Cal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 40; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Scizures (1st ed § 71). 
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without n warrant only wht'll it i" inl'idental to n lawful arrest 
on the prellli"cs strikes a bnlnnce between the COllllllunity's 
interest in law cllforCCIllf'nt Ilnd its interest in preserving' 
the privncy of hOllle,;, nnd it Call110t be extended to permit 
warrantlcoss sl':lI'ches of other premises where ('vidence lllay 
he found without sanctioning invllsions of the privacy of 
third pnrties IlIcrely hecnuse they may have had sOllie as-
sociatil'll with the p,'rs,'n :1l'l'l'"tcd. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Joseph L. Call, Judge. Judgments reversed; appeal from 
order dismissed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of heroin. Judgments of 
conviction reversed. 
Boags & Worrell and C. V. Worrell for Defendants and 
A ppellan ts. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As' 
sistant Attorney General, allcl I.Jawrence R. Tapper, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ' 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants Joseph Shelton and Margie 
Victorian appeal from judgments of conviction of possessing 
heroin in violation of Health and Safety Code, section 11500, 
and from the order denying their motion for new trial. The 
appC'al from the order denying a new trial is dismissed. (Pen. 
Code, § 1237.) 
Officer Hanks of the Narcotics Division of the Los Angeles 
Police Department testified that he had investigated defend-
ant Shclton for several years and had received many reports 
from informants that Shelton was a dealer in heroin. He 
knew that Shelton had been convicted once of a narcotic 
charge and had been arrested twice on narcotic charges that 
did not result in convictions. He had often seen Shelton in 
., high frequency narcotics areas," and in February 1962 he 
saw him talking to a known heroin dealer. Officer Hanks 
talked several timcs with Eunice Baul, a narcotics user, who 
told him that Shelton was a dealer ill heroin and kept her 
supplied with it. Officer Grennan, another narcotics officer, 
had also talked with Baul and had used her information to 
obtain convictions of narcotic offenders. Officer Hanks always 
found Baul's information consistent with other information 
hc had. 
On March 22, 1962 Officers Hanks and Grennan and two 
other officers went to an apartment house and showed the 
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manager a picture of Shelton and described Baul. The mana-
ger told the officers that Shelton and BanI were occupyin~ 
apartment No.1 and that her husband had seen Shelton hide 
what he believed to be narcotics in the hallway. She gave the 
officers two hypodermic needles in a plastic case that she said 
she found in the hallway over tlIe doorway to apartment No. 
1. The officers waited outsidc the door of the apartment until 
Baul opened it to leave and then entered the apartment and 
arrested Shelton and BauI. The officers searched the apart-
ment but found no narcotics or other contraband. They 
searched Shelton and found a key and a rent receipt for an 
apartment No. 212. Shelton denied knowledge of the receipt 
and said that Baul gavc it to him. She said that she found it 
in Shelton's car and told the officers '" I know he isn't 
going to take me there. That's where he's got Margie.' " 
The officers asked her if Shelton had any" junk" there, and 
she replied, " 'He very well could. He could be using that as 
a stash pot for some junk.' " 
Having ascertained that apartment No. 212 was on West 
87th Street, the officers told Shelton they were going to take 
him there to have the manager identify him. Shelton then 
admitted that he had rented the apartment the preceding 
night. Officer Hanks asked Shelton, " '. " who is in [apart-
ment No. 212] now, JoeT' He says, 'There is no one.' I said, 
'Do you have any junk in there!' He says, 'No.' I said, 
'How about if we go down and take a look Y' He says, 'All 
right, go ahead.''' The officcrs took Slwlton to apartment 
No. 212 on Wrst 87th Street and knocked on the door. After 
some delay defcndant Victorian ashd who was there. The 
officers asked Shelton to say it was he, but he refused to do 
so. Officer Hanks then said, " 'All right, police officer. Open 
the door right now.''' Victorian opened the door, and 
Officer Hanks testified that she had a hypodrrmic needle at-
tached to an eye dropper in her left hand. Both defendants 
testified that when she opened the door Victorian had no 
clothing on and had nothing in her hand. The officers arrest-
ed Victorian and searched the apartment. They found two 
balloons containing heroin in a shoe box. The manager testi-
fied that the box was not in the apartment when he rented it 
to defendants the preceding evening. Victorian told the offi 
cers that Shelton brought her the two balloons, but she reo 
fused to repeat the statement in front of Shelton and later 
dC'Jlird that she had made it. 
Dcfl'lldants contend that the trial court erred in overruling 
J 
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their objection to the introduction of the hypodermic needle 
and heroin into evidence on the ground that they were ob. 
taincd in the course of an unlawful search of their apart· 
ment. [1] Since the search was made without a warrant, the 
burden was on the prosecution to show proper justification. 
(People v. King, ante, pp. 308, 311 [32 Cal.Rptr. 825, 384 
P.2d 153] ; People v. Haven, 59 Ca1.2d 713, 717 [31 Ca1.Rptr. 
47, 381 P.2d 927] ; Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 269, 
272 [294 P.2d 23].) The prosecution not only failed to sus· 
tain that burden, but established by the testimony of the 
arresting officers themselves that there was no justification. 
The evidence was therefore illegally obtained and should 
have been excluded. 
[2] The search cannot be justified as incidcnt to thc ar· 
rest of defendant Shelton, for he was arrested at the apart· 
ment he occupied with Baul approximately 2 miles away. 
(People v. King, ante, pp. 308, 311 [32 Cal.Rptr. 825, 384 
P.2d 153] ; People v. Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713, 719 [31 Cal.Rptr. 
47, 381 P.2d 927); Castaneda v. Superior Court, 59 Ca1.2d 
439, 442 [30 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641] ; Tompkins v. Superi. 
or Court, 59 Ca1.2d 65, 67 [27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113] ; 
People v. Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 781 [291 P.2d 469).} 
[3] The search cannot be justified on the ground that the 
officers had reasonable cause to believe that Shelton was in 
possession of narcotics at the West 87th Street apartment. 
Even if it is assumcd that the officers' knowledge of Shel· 
ton's narcotics activities, his initial denial of any conllcction 
with the apartment, and Baul's statement that " 'He could 
be using ... [the apartment) as a stash pot for some 
junk'" constituted reasonable cause to believe that there 
were narcotics in the apartment, a search without a warrant 
could be justified only as incident to a lawful arrest therein 
or pursuant to a valid consent. As the United States Suprem" 
Court stated in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.s. 610, 61a 
[81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828, 831), "Until Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 20 [46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409). 
this Court had never directly decided, but had always as· 
sumed, 'that one's house cannot lawfully be searcIled without 
a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest 
therein' (td., 269 U.S. at page 32, 46 S.Ct. at page 6 [70 
Jj.Ed. at p. 149, 51 A.L.R. at p. 413)), but that case decided 
that 'Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is 
cOllcl'aled in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a 
scarch of that place without a warrant. And such searches 
are ... unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably show-
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ing probable cause.' [d., 269 U.S. at pagc 33, 46 S.Ct. at page 
6 [70 L.Ed. at p. 149, 51 A.hR. at p. 414]." (See also, 
People v. Ilaven, 59 Ca\'2d 713, 720 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 
P.2d 927J; Castaneda v. Superior Court, 59 Ca1.2d 439, 443-
444 [30 Cal.Hptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641] ; People v. Edgar, ante, pp. 
170, 174 [32 Cal.Rptr. 41, 383 P.211 44!)].) 
[4] The st'archcannot bc justified on the ground that tht! 
officers 11ad reasonable cause to arrest Victorian before they 
demanded that she open the door. Although the informer 
Baul apparently knew that Victorian was at the apartment, 
she did not tell the officers that Victorian was also a user or 
was involved with Shelton in the narcotics traffic. Thus, even 
if the officrrs had reasonable cause to believe that Shclton 
had narcotics at the apartment, they had no reasonable cause 
to believe that his possession, if any, was shared with Victo-
rian. Before they demanded that the door be opened, they 
knew only that a woman was in an apartment where Shelton ; 
may lIave stored narcotics. Such association between a sus-
pect and evcn a known criminal by itself is not reasonable 
eause for an arrest and search. (United States v. Di Re, 332 
U.S. 581, 587 [68 S.Ct. 222, !)2 L.Ed. 210, 216]; Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436, 
441] ; 'l'ompkills v. Superior COllrt, 59 Ca1.2d 65, 67-68 [27 
Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113] ; People v. Kitchens, 46 Ca1.2d 
260,263 [2!)4 P.2d 17] ; People v. Sanders, 46 Cal.2d 247, 251 
[294 P.2d 10], and cases citrd; People v. Boyd, 173 Cal.App. 
2d 537. 539 [343 P.2d 283] ; People v. Green, 152 Cal.App.2d 
886, 889 [313 P.2d 955]; People v. Yet Ning Yee, 145 Cal. 
App.2d 513, 517 [302 P.2d 616].) 
[5] The seareh eannot be justifird on the ground that 
Shelton consented to it. It is true that one of the officl'rs 
testified that Shclton responded, "All right, go ahead," 
when the officer snggested they go to the apartment and take a 
look. The fact that Shelton was under arrest at the tinw, 
however, and his subseqnent refusal to assist the officers in 
gaining access to the apartment establish that his apparent 
consent was not voluntarily given. (Ca.dalll'da v. Superio,' 
Conrt, 59 Ca1.2d 439, 442-443 [30 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641 J : 
People v. Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713, 720 [31 Ca1.Rptr. 47, 3tH 
P.2d 9271; see also People v. Gory. 45 Ca1.2d 776, 782, fn. 2 
[291 P.2d 46!)].) Mor('()ver, even if Shrlton had \'olllntaril~' 
cOllsrnted to the sparch, his consent could not justify th,' 
im'asion of his joint occupant's privacy that occllrrcd ",he'll 
the officer demanded that the door be opened. (Tompkins v. 
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Superior Oourt, 59 Cal.2d 65, G9 [27 Cu1.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 
11:3].) 
[6a] 'rile srareh ('a1111ot he justified on the ground that 
Victorian voluntarily opened the door and thereby ('xposed 
evidence sufficient to justify llrr arrrst and a search incidcnt 
thereto. [7] "To protl'ct his right to object to an unreason-
able search or seizure a defendant need not forcibly resist an 
officer's assertion of authority to enter llis llOmc or s('arch it 
or his person [citations], but if lIe freely consents to an entry 
or search, or voluntarily produces evidence against himself, 
his constitutional rights arc 110t violated and any searcll or 
taking of evidence pursuant to llis consent is not unreason-
able. [Citations.] [8] Whetller in a particular case an ap-
parent consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in sub-
mission to an express or imp1ird assertion of authority, is a I 
qu('stion of fact to be determiued in the ligllt of all the cir-
cumstances." (People v. Michael, 45 Ca1.2d 751,753 [290' 
P.2d 852].) [6b] Thefe is no room for doubt in the present 
case, for the officer candidly testified that he demanded that 
Victorian "Open the door right now." When he made that· 
demand he had no reasonable cause to arrest Victorian and 
no right to order the door opened. Since it was opened by 
virtue of thc wrongful assertion of authority (People v. 
Edgar, antI'. pp. 171. 174 [32 Cnl.Rptr. 41. 383 P.2rl 449] ; 
People v. lI1ichael, 45 Ca1.2d 751, 753 [290 P.2d 852]), the· 
officers could not rely on what tlH'y then saw to justify Vic· 
torian's arrest and the search incidrnt thereto. (People v. 
Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713, 718 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927] ; 
Tompkins v. Superior Oourt, 59 Ca1.2d 65, 68 [27 Ca1.Rptr. 
8~!J, 378 P.2d 1131 ; People v. Brown, 45 Ca1.2d 640, 643-645 
[~!JO P.2d 528].) 
[9] The right to seek int('rviewR with sl1~peets at th('ir 
homes (People v. llIartin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 761 [~!)O P.2d 855); 
People v. Michael, 45 Cal.2d 751, 754 [290 P.2d 852]) dot':,! 
not include the.> ri~ht to demand that a Ruspect open his door. 
[10] .A suspect has no duty to cooperate with officers ill 
!;;('cnring' e\'i<l('nce against him, and in tIle absence of probable 
cause to make an arrest, he is entitled to have a magistrate 
dctermine wlH'th('r th('re is justification for im'ading th(' pri. 
yacy of his home. (People v. Edgar, ante, pp. 171, 17;; [32 
Ca1.Rptr. 41, 383 P.2d 449] ; People v. Haven, 59 Ca1.2d 713, 
7~0 [31 Cal.Hptr. 47, 381 P.2d 9271; Oastaneda v. Snpcriol' 
('ollrt, 59 Ca1.2d 439, 443 [30 CaJ.Rptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641].) 
Thus, ill approving the officers' conduct in seeking inter-
views in the Michael case and the lIlartin case, we were care· 
) (J 
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ful to point out out that we were not dealing with inquiries 
"accompanied with any assertion of a right to enter or 
search or secure answers" (People v. Michael, 45 Ca1.2d 751, 
754 [290 P.2d 852]) or made with a demand "that the door 
be opened or that [the officers] be admitted." (People v. 
Martin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 761 [290 P.2d 855].) 
We are not here eoncerned with the rule that "circumstan-
ces short of probable cause to make an arrest may still justify 
an officer's stopping pedestrians or motorists on the street; 
for questioning." (People v. Mickelson, 59 Ca1.2d 448, 4iill 
[30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) What we are concernf'd 
with is the right of all persons to be free from unreasollabh· 
invasions of the privacy of their homes. [11] The right to 
seek interviews does not justify an officer's intruding himst,jf 
into a home without consent, either physically (People \'. 
Haven, 59 Ca1.2d 713, 717 [31 Ca1.Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927Ji 
or by a view of the interior made possible only by a wlon~ful 
assertion of authority. (People v. Edgar, ante, pp. 171, 174 
[32 Ca1.Rptr. 41, 383 P.2d 449].) "There are many reasons 
other than guilt of a felony why an occupant of an apart-
ment may not wish himself or others present exposed to the 
immediatc view of a stranger, even if the stranger is a police 
officer." (Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Ca1.2d 65, 68 [27 
Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113].) 
[12] The rule that permits a search without a warrant 
only when it is incidental to a lawful arrest on the premises 
strikes a balance between the community's interest in law 
enforcement and its interest in preserving the privacy of 
homes. It cannot be extended to permit warrantless searches 
of other premises where evidence may be found without sanc~ 
tioning invasions of the privacy of third parties merely be-
cause they may have had some association with the person 
arrested. 
" 'The point of the Fourth Amendment, which oftcn is not 
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforce-
ment the support of the usual inferences which reasonable 
men draw from evidence. Its protE'ction consists in requiring 
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engagcd in 
the often compctitive cnterprise of ferrcting out crime. Any 
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's 
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will 
justify tile officers in making a search without a warrant 
would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the peo-
) 
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pie's homes sccurc only in the discrction of police officers .... 
The right of officers to thrust themsclves into a home is also a 
grave concern, not only to the individual but to a socicty 
which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom 
from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by 
a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforce-
ment agent.''' (Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 
614-615 [81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828, 832], quoting from 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 
L.Ed. 436, 440].) 
The judgments are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. 
On March 21, 1962, Shelton and Victorian, the defendants, 
rented an apartment on 87th Street in Los Angeles as Mr. 
and Mrs. Jones, and they took imluediate possession. 
Defendant Shelton llad been under surveillance for some 
time by policc officers because of reputed transactions in her-
oin and past arrests on narcotic charges, which, however. had 
not resulted in convictions. 
Eunice BauI, who occupied an apartment on Western A.ve-
nue in Los Angeles with defcndant Shelton, had told police 
officers about Shelton's narcotic purchases as a dealer and 
stated that he was her supplier. In the past she had proved 
reliable in giving such information. 
On March 22, 1962, the officers went to the Western Ave· 
nue apartment house. They spoke with the manager, who told 
them which apartment defendant Shelton and Miss Baul oc-
cupied and informed them that some hypodermic needles had 
been found hidden over the doorway. 
The officers waited outside the apartment door until Miss 
Baul opened the door, apparently to leave. Thcy entered and 
placed both defendant Shelton and Miss Baul under arrest. 
The officers searched defendant Shelton and found a rent 
receipt for the 87th Street apartment. Defendant Shelton 
denied knowledge of the receipt, claiming Mi!>'S Baul had 
given it to him; but Miss Baul said that she found the reo 
ceipt in his ear and added: "I know he isn't going to take 
me there. That's where he's got Margie." When asked 
whether defendant Shelton had any ,. junk" there, Mis~ 
Baul replied, " ... He could be using tllat as a stash pot fOt 
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some junk." No narcotics were found in the Western Ave-
nue apartment. 
The officers immediately investigated the 87th Street apart-
ment and learned that defendant Shelton was living there 
with a woman. 
They told defendant Shelton they would take him there for 
identification by the manager, and Shelton then admitted 
that he had rented the apartment. 
One of the officers asked defendant Shelton, "Who is there 
now?" and defendant Shelton said, "No one." The officer 
asked if he had any" junk" there, and Shelton said, "No." 
The officer then said, "How about if we go down and take a 
look," and Shelton replied, " .All right, go ahead." 
The officers went to the 87th Street apartment with de-
fendant Shelton and knocked on the door. A woman asked 
who was there. When the officers asked defendant Shelton to 
respond, he refused. 
The officers then announced themselves and demanded that 
the door be opened. Defendant Victorian opened the door, 
holding in one hand a hypodermic needle attached to an 
eyedropper. She was immediately placed under arrest and 
the apartment searched. Two balloons containing heroin ,vere 
found in a shoebox. Defendant Victorian told the officers that 
defendant Shelton had given the balloons to her the preced-
ing night; but she would not repeat the statement before 
defendant Shelton, and she later denied having made the 
statement. 
This is the sole question to be determined: Was the incrim-
inating evidence obtained by means of an unlawful search 
and seizure T 
No. Based on information as to defendant Shelton's past 
narcotics activities, the officers had reasonable cause to arrest 
him at the Western Avenue apartment in the company of 
Miss Baul, an admitted user of narcotics allegedly supplied 
by defendant Shelton. (People v. Boyles, 45 Ca1.2d 652, 656 
[9,8bl [290 P.2d 535].) 
It is not unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with 
suspects or witnesses or to call upon them at their homes for 
such purposes. (People v. Mar·tin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 761 [8] [290 
P.2d 855]; People v. McGhee, 196 Cal.App.2d 458,460 [11 
[16 Cal.Rptr. 625].) 
In the instant case the police officers had information inti-
mating that defendant Victorian was living with defendant 
Shelton at the 87th Street apartment; that she might be a 
) 
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user of narcotics supplird by llim, as was the informant, Miss 
BauI; t11at as a joint occupant of the apartment defendant 
Victorian might consent to its seare11; and that narcotics 
might be found there. 
'Vhen defendant Victorian opened the door, shc was hold· 
ing in her hand a llypodermic outfit. (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11555.) At this point the officers' information provoking 
her investigation as a narcotics suspect and the principle of 
privacy as an individual liberty had to be equated, and it 
was for the trial court to dctermine the reasonableness of the 
officers' action in the light of the factual situation presented 
to them, having in mind that tlH'ir judgment must be formed 
without undue delay and without tIle benefit of long medita· 
tion. (People v. Alcala, 204 Cal.App.2d 15, 20 [41 [22 Cal. 
Rptr.311 [hearing denied by the Suprcme Court1.) 
Under the circumstances, the officers were justified in pro· 
ceeding with their investigation, entering the 87th Street 
apartment, and searching there incidental to the arrest of 
defendant Victorian, who was holding incriminating evidence 
when they entered. 
I would affirm the judgments. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
